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Disinformation Legislation and Freedom 
of Expression 
Fernando Nuñez 
The rise of disinformation on social media has prompted governments around the world 
to enact legislation that may affect every person’s right to freedom of opinion and expression. 
This Note seeks to explore the rise of disinformation and the legal framework that applies 
and to highlight some of the recent proposals to combat disinformation on social media. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The right to freedom of opinion and expression is a central pillar of democratic 
societies and a guarantor of free and fair electoral processes. Disinformation poses 
a significant threat to that right as it is increasingly used to influence elections and 
public perception around the world. An aggressive disinformation campaign can 
distort the “marketplace of ideas,” where truth is expected to triumph, by flooding 
the market with falsities. Although the problem of disinformation has been around 
for centuries, it has been compounded by the internet and popularity of social media 
platforms. The combination of social media and advancing technology has enabled 
the production of disinformation at a scale that threatens an individual’s right to 
receive and impart ideas. 
In the United States, ninety-three percent of the adult population said they 
received at least some news online,1 with over sixty percent of them getting their 
news from social media platforms.2 These platforms have become a necessity 
around the world as well. It is estimated that eighty-six percent of Middle Eastern 
internet users rely upon social media platforms, compared to eighty-two percent in 
Latin America, seventy-six percent in Africa, sixty-six percent in Asia and the 
Pacific, and sixty-five percent in Europe.3 This new trend of increasing reliance on 
social media for news is rising at the same time that trust in traditional media is 
declining.4 
In recent years, legislation aimed at countering disinformation has surged 
around the world.5 Governments are experimenting with different strategies, 
ranging from creating task forces to outright criminalizing the dissemination of false 
content.6 While the issue of disinformation is deserving of the attention it is 
receiving, some governmental responses have posed significant problems of their 
own. Some have gone as far as to shut down the internet to prevent the spread of 
disinformation.7 
 
1. Digital News Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. ( July 6, 2019), http://www.journalism.org/fact-
sheet/digital-news/ [http://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/digital-news/]. 
2. Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016,  
PEW RES. CTR.  (May 26, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-
media-platforms-2016/ [https://perma.cc/XPF5-Y2LA]. 
3. Jacob Poushter, Smartphone Ownership and Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging 
Economies, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/02/22/smartphone-
ownership-and-internet-usage-continues-to-climb-in-emerging-economies/ [https://perma.cc/ED 
C8-J3HF]. 
4. Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx [https://
perma.cc/H4HW-2BAK]. 
5. Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to Anti-Misinformation Actions Around the World, 
POYNTER, https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions/ [https://perma.cc/82VR-
HXMD] ( last updated Aug. 13, 2018). 
6. Id. 
7. Tinuola Dada & Peter Micek, Launching STOP: The #KeepItOn Internet Shutdown Tracker, 
ACCESS NOW (Sept. 7, 2017, 12:42 PM), https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-shutdown-tracker/ 
[https://perma.cc/JY68-S5J5 ]. 
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In light of the rise in disinformation legislation, it is helpful to understand the 
freedom of expression framework that applies and examine the different 
approaches legislators can take while still conforming to their obligation to uphold 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression. This Note focuses on 
disinformation legislation as it relates to social media platforms and explores some 
of the potential options that would be appropriate to combat the spread of 
disinformation. Part I serves as context for disinformation, why it currently poses a 
problem, and how it will worsen with technological advances. Part II describes how 
the marketplace of ideas has failed to strike a balance with disinformation and, as a 
result, legislation may be necessary to restore the market’s equilibrium. Part III 
briefly sets forth the relevant domestic and international legal frameworks from 
which any such disinformation legislation will need to conform. Part IV then 
analyzes some of the more popular legislation that has either been enacted by certain 
governments or proposed by various actors, including legislators, civil society, and 
international organizations. 
Ultimately, legislation that is aimed at increasing people’s digital media literacy 
and access to information on social media platforms is in line with freedom of 
expression principles and could reduce the impact of disinformation. Such an 
approach avoids the risk of governments or private actors wielding the power to 
determine what is truthful and places that power with the users. However, more 
aggressive legislation may be viable depending on how it is implemented. Legislation 
that seeks to hold social media platforms liable for failing to remove content can 
conform to freedom of expression principles if it satisfies due process requirements 
and does not overly burden the platforms or encourage them to be overinclusive 
with their removals. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS 
As it is used in this Note, disinformation is defined as the deliberate creation 
and sharing of information that one knows is false.8 Disinformation is often 
confused with misinformation, which is the inadvertent sharing of false 
information,9 and both are frequently lumped together under the all-encompassing 
term “fake news.” However, it is important to recognize the distinction between the 
three terms to properly address the unique threats that each one presents. 
Disinformation is a more serious threat to freedom of expression because it is 
information that is deliberately created to mislead and influence the public, unlike 
 
8. European Comm’n High Level Expert Grp. on Fake News & Online Disinformation, A 
Multi-dimensional Approach to Disinformation: Report of the Independent High Level Group on Fake News 
and Online Disinformation, EUR. COMMISSION (Mar. 12, 2018), available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation 
[https://perma.cc/9LMJ-FDYR] [hereinafter A Multi-dimensional Approach to Disinformation ]. 
9. CHERILYN IRETON & JULIE POSETTI, UNESCO, JOURNALISM, ‘FAKE NEWS’  
& DISINFORMATION 7 (2018), https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/journalism_fake_news_ 
disinformation_print_friendly_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHS4-QMWY]. 
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misinformation, which may be shared under a genuine belief that its contents are 
truthful.10 Finally, using the term “fake news” is not helpful because it has been 
routinely used to describe subjectively unfavorable content or inaccurate content 
that is the result of mistake.11 
Disinformation has been an issue that societies have dealt with for centuries. 
It can be traced as far back as the invention of the printing press in 1439.12 But the 
technology that is available today amplifies the effects of disinformation to levels 
previously unimaginable.13 For example, modern technology allows for the creation 
of convincing fake audio and video content known as “Deepfake.”14 This type of 
content is made possible by automated computer programs that allow for users to 
superimpose images and videos onto unrelated images or videos.15 This used to be 
a time-intensive and skilled task, but artificial intelligence programs have made it 
easier and more efficient for people to create convincing fake videos of individuals 
doing or saying things they never did.16 The spread of this technology means that 
the line between fact and fiction may be blurred with negative consequences. Either 
people will believe the videos, which, if released at strategic times, could sway public 
opinion in an election or incite protests, or people will stop believing in videos as 
objective depictions of reality, which will make it increasingly difficult to prove  
a fact. 
Modern technology has not only provided new, convincing, false content, it 
has also facilitated its dissemination. Social media platforms have made sharing 
content faster than ever by the retweeting, sharing, or reposting mechanisms they 
have implemented. This may not be a problem on its own, but recent research 
suggests that not all content spreads at the same rate. Research from Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) suggests that false content spreads up to six times 
faster than factual content on social media sites and false news stories are seventy 
percent more likely to be shared.17 Besides the users’ eagerness to share novel 
content with their circles, a contributing factor to the quick spread of false news is 
 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 14. 
12. Jacob Soll, The Long and Brutal History of Fake News, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2016),  
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-214535  
[https://perma.cc/4UFT-A9AT]. 
13. IRETON & POSETTI, supra note 9, at 15. 
14. Id. at 111. 
15. Donie O’Sullivan, When Seeing Is No Longer Believing: Inside the Pentagon’s Race Against 
Deepfake Vidoes, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/01/business/pentagons-race-
against-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/U927-Z9FM] ( last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
16. Id. 
17. Peter Dizikes, Study: On Twitter, False News Travels Faster Than True Stories, MIT  
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), http://news.mit.edu/2018/study-twitter-false-news-travels-faster-true-stories-
0308 [https://perma.cc/C25X-D3GA]. 
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that algorithms used in some platforms tend to suggest similar content from  
similar sources.18 
The internet has also incentivized disinformation by turning it into a lucrative 
business.19 Disinformation is cheap to produce because its producers do not have 
to engage in time-consuming cross-referencing or fact-checking. Disinformation 
also has nominal overhead costs to disseminate because posting on social media 
platforms is generally free. With the costs of production and distribution almost 
insignificant, a website dedicated to spreading disinformation can use online 
advertising to make a profit without the costs associated with investigation and 
verification that burden professional news agencies.20 In 2016, a small town in 
Macedonia was discovered to be the source of many of these websites that were 
designed to profit from the U.S. presidential election.21 One of the website’s 
operators claimed to make $2500 a day from this enterprise.22 That business is 
preparing to continue its operations during the 2020 U.S. presidential election.23 
II. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO LEGISLATION? 
In the marketplace of ideas, falsehoods compete with truth until truth 
prevails.24 However, the market will not work if it has been compromised. As with 
most markets, “if the competitive nature of the market is eliminated . . . or if the 
market’s rationality is corrupted through socialization or propaganda, then the 
marketplace can no longer be trusted to properly value a particular good or 
service.”25 The recent proliferation of disinformation on the internet seems to call 
into question the theory’s presuppositions and renders it inadequate to remedy  
the problem. 
The marketplace of ideas rests on three pillars.26 First, that ideas clash and are 
in constant dialogue with each other.27 This requires the ideas to be accessible. 
Second, that the participants in the market are capable and willing to distinguish 
 
18. Id.; Juan Carlos Escudero de Jesús, Fake News and the Systemic Lie in the Marketplace of 
Ideas: A Judicial Problem?, 87 REVISTA JURIDICA U.P.R. 1394, 1407 (2018). 
19. Clare Duffy, Websites That Peddle Disinformation Make Millions of Dollars in Ads, New 
Study Finds, CNN (Aug. 18, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/18/tech/advertising-
disinformation-money-reliable-sources/index.html [https://perma.cc/R7KY-28FF]. 
20. See id. 
21. Isa Soares, The Fake News Machine: Inside a Town Gearing Up for 2020, CNN, https://
money.cnn.com/interactive/media/the-macedonia-story/ [https://perma.cc/VW93-G6AF] ( last 
visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. The U.S. Supreme Court first introduced the concept of the marketplace of ideas through 
Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
It was later adopted by a majority of the Court in 1974 and has been reiterated ever since. Gertz  
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
25. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (1984). 
26. Escudero de Jesús, supra note 18, at 1396. 
27. Id. 
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truth from falsehood.28 This is connected to the first pillar in that recipients of the 
information must be able to compare conflicting ideas and have the tools to enable 
them to choose the truthful idea, but it also requires them to be rational when 
making a determination in what to believe. Third, that falsehoods are accidental and 
that their promoters are in pursuit of the truth.29 Proponents of ideas are not 
supposed to knowingly spread false ideas and manipulate others into believing 
them. Recent scholarship suggests that disinformation has undermined each pillar 
of the marketplace of ideas theory.30 
Regarding the first pillar, many users of social media do not benefit from the 
clash of ideas that is supposed to occur in a healthy market because they have been 
isolated from opposing views.31 In the political context, due in large part to the 
functionality of social media platforms, supporters of one candidate or party are 
unlikely to “follow” an opposing candidate or party, which makes them less likely 
to encounter contradictory ideas and further entrenches them in their beliefs.32 This 
echo chamber problem worsens when it is combined with content that is targeted 
at its viewer’s confirmation bias, which results in sharing content based solely on 
the headline without verifying the underlying facts.33 
Disinformation undermines the marketplace’s second pillar because once 
disinformation is believed, it is difficult to undo. Once a false story is disseminated, 
it is exceedingly difficult to counter it with the truth for two reasons. First, not all 
of the people that saw and were persuaded by the false story will subsequently 
encounter the truthful story. The lack of exposure to countervailing information 
that is central to the first pillar is implicated here. Second, and perhaps most 
problematic, of those people that do later encounter the truthful story, many of 
them are reluctant to adjust their beliefs.34 A recent study showed that the vast 
majority of news readers maintained their beliefs based on a false story even after it 
was proven to them that what they read was false.35 The marketplace simply does 
not work when its participants are reluctant to accept truth that contradicts their 
previously held beliefs. 
Finally, the third pillar of the marketplace of ideas is directly contradicted by 
the recent rise of the disinformation business.36 Actors who engage in spreading 
disinformation are rarely interested in having their ideas compete with the truth.37 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 1407. 
32. Id. 
33. Filippo Menczer, Fake Online News Spreads Through Social Echo Chambers,  
SCI. AM. (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fake-online-news-spreads-
through-social-echo-chambers/ [https://perma.cc/Z2V3-RSG3]. 
34. Emily Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misinformation, 33  
POL. COMM. 460, 477 (2016). 
35. Id. 
36. Soares, supra note 21. 
37. Id. 
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They specifically target certain demographics and may only do so on a temporary 
basis.38 Competition on the merits of an idea is not what they are after. Rather, 
disinformation often buries the truth by flooding the market with falsehoods. 
Disinformation is cheap to produce and disseminate on social media, whereas the 
truth usually requires verification and investigation, which are expensive endeavors. 
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The marketplace of ideas has been ineffective to deal with the spread of 
disinformation. Thus, to ensure that the truth is discoverable, intervention by the 
state may be necessary. However, because some of the largest social media 
platforms are U.S.-based companies with a large presence around the world, the 
legislation that regulates them should account for its legal implications both in the 
United States and abroad so as not to overly burden the platforms with inconsistent 
and sometimes contradicting policies. 
A. United States 
The main concern for regulating disinformation on social media platforms is 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”39 Under 
First Amendment jurisprudence, much of which developed when public debate 
occurred via pamphlets and speeches in public forums, courts have generally not 
been receptive towards regulations of speech that are based on the speech’s content, 
especially when the speech is political.40 Content-based restrictions on speech are 
analyzed under the highest level of scrutiny, called “strict scrutiny,” and will only be 
upheld if they (1) further a compelling governmental interest and (2) are narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest.41 Thus, any regulations that are based on whether 
the speaker’s message is true or false are content-based and subject to strict scrutiny 
analysis, which almost always results in striking down the regulation. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed certain restrictions on speech that it 
determined does not deserve full First Amendment protection.42 Those categories 
of speech include fraud, obscenities, defamation, and incitement.43 The Court has 
been hesitant to add other categories to the list.44 Disinformation intended to 
influence elections may be enough of a compelling state interest for the first 
 
38. See id. 
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“The First Amendment affords the broadest 
protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”) (quoting Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
41. Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
42. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012). 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 722. 
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prong.45 However, even if that were the case, the regulation would have to be 
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal which presents major hurdles because it must 
be the least restrictive means of achieving the purported goal, a difficult standard 
to meet. 
Due to First Amendment concerns of legislating content on social media 
platforms, much of the content regulation is left to the discretion of the platforms 
themselves by way of their community standards.46 The platforms are free to 
remove content as they please without much government interference. That is in 
large part due to section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(CDA), which states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”47 As a result, the CDA immunizes sites such as 
Facebook and YouTube from liability arising out of the content posted by their 
users.48 This statute was created during the early days of the internet to prevent 
interactive computer service providers from being subjected to countless lawsuits 
based on the content their users posted.49 The rationale for such a blanket 
exemption from liability is to protect freedom of expression, which would be chilled 
because the platforms would overregulate their content out of fear of being sued. 
B. International 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides the right for freedom of expression and opinion by stating that “[e]veryone 
shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.”50 Article 19(2) further 
states that the right to freedom of expression includes the “freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”51 The United Nations Human Rights 
Council and General Assembly have stated that the freedoms people enjoy offline 
also apply online.52 
 
45. For an analysis of this issue, see Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to 
American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 216 (2017). 
46. See Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ 
hate_speech [https://perma.cc/Q45S 6FBH] ( last visited Jan. 3,  2020); Ad Policy: Hateful Content,  
TWITTER, https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/prohibited-content-policies/hate-
content.html [https://perma.cc/QY2W-MWNY] ( last visited Jan. 3, 2020); Hate Speech 
Policy, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en [https://perma.cc/
3BAJ-CHMG] ( last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
47. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
48. See id. 
49. Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 95  
DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 118 (2018). 
50. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
51. Id. 
52. See G.A. Res. 68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013); Human Rights Council Res. 26/13, U.N. Doc.  
A/HRC/RES/26/13 (June 26, 2014);  Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 
RES/32/13 ( July 18, 2016); see also Human Rights Council Res. 32/38, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 
(Nov. 5, 2016). 
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Under the ICCPR, states may adopt restrictions on content, but only as 
allowed by Article 19(3).53 Under Article 19(3), any restriction on the right to 
freedom of expression must be provided by law and necessary to protect the rights 
or reputations of others and “[f]or the protection of national security or of public 
order . . . or of public health or morals.”54 Such restrictions, however, must conform 
to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality.55 Proportionality must ensure that 
the restrictions target a specific objective and do not unduly intrude upon the rights 
of targeted persons.56 Finally, the restrictions must be “the least intrusive instrument 
amongst those which might achieve” the desired result.57 
In the 2017 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, 
Disinformation and Propaganda, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and other 
intergovernmental experts concluded that “[g]eneral prohibitions on the 
dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including ‘false 
news’ or ‘non-objective information’ are incompatible . . . and should be 
abolished.”58 Laws and regulations that require, or pressure, private entities to 
censor or remove content based on these vague and ambiguous criteria are a threat 
to the exercise of free expression.59 That is because private entities are ill-equipped 
to monitor and regulate such content, and the possibility of facing high fines or the 
loss of the ability to operate can force platforms to over-regulate and 
disproportionately censor a wide range of permissible content. 
IV. DISINFORMATION LEGISLATION 
Legislating social media platforms based on disinformation comes with 
dangerous risks. It gives governments that are hostile towards the media a new 
means of silencing unfavorable opinions. The recent popularity of disinformation 
legislation comes as Freedom House’s 2017 report on global press freedoms found 
that media freedom was at its lowest point in thirteen years and that there were 
“unprecedented threats to journalists and media outlets in major democracies and 
new moves by authoritarian states to control the media, including beyond their 
borders.”60 Some governments have unfortunately capitalized on the rising 
 
53. ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 19(3). 
54. Id. 
55. Human Rights Committee, Art. 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, General 
Comment No. 34, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
56. Id. at ¶¶ 34–35. 
57. Id. at ¶ 34. 
58. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda, 
ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION EUR. (Mar. 3, 2017),  https://www.osce.org/fom/302796  
[https://perma.cc/5MK7-F4PQ] [hereinafter Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression ]. 
59. Id. 
60. Press Freedom’s Dark Horizon, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/freedom-press-2017 [https://perma.cc/A8LQ-BHSR] ( last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
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concerns of disinformation and enacted or proposed legislation that is in violation 
of freedom of expression rights.61 However, unchecked disinformation may also 
have serious negative effects on peoples’ ability to enjoy their right to freedom of 
expression and can have destabilizing effects on democracies. Thus, it is helpful to 
determine what legislators can do to stop the spread of disinformation while not 
infringing on the human right of freedom of opinion and expression. In that light, 
the following legislative approaches have been proposed by legislators in the United 
States and abroad, civil society, and international organizations. 
A. Digital Media Literacy 
Perhaps the best way to stem the flow of disinformation and have the lowest 
risk of intruding on freedom of expression is by enacting legislation that is aimed at 
enhancing digital media literacy. Digital media literacy can be defined as “the 
capacity to exert critical thinking as to the productions, representations, languages 
(visuals, texts, sounds), audiences and communities characteristic of mainstream 
and social media.”62 By enhancing their citizens’ digital media literacy, states can not 
only reduce the effects of disinformation but they can also benefit from a more 
educated citizenry. An effective policy would be one that strives for a population of 
citizens that are both alert to the threat of disinformation and armed with the 
critical-thinking skills necessary to reduce its effects. A media-critical citizenry will 
have the added benefit of incentivizing media companies to produce higher  
quality content. 
Media literacy initiatives should be holistic in their approach. They should 
incorporate a school curriculum with adequate teacher training. Curricula will 
inevitably vary, but focus should be placed on skills that allow people to distinguish 
truthful information from false information. The International Society for 
Technology and Education has set out model standards for teaching “[s]tudents [to] 
evaluate the accuracy, perspective, credibility and relevance of information, media, 
data or other resources.”63 Furthermore, because digital media is constantly 
evolving, as evident by the advances of Deepfake technology, digital media literacy 
should be a lifelong process that accounts for the continuing education of adults. 
Finally, increasing digital media literacy should be a partnership between 
government, educational institutions, journalists, social media platforms, and  
civil society. 
B. Transparency Initiatives 
Legislation aimed at ensuring transparency could also be instrumental in 
combating disinformation, while upholding the right of freedom of expression. 
 
61. Id. 
62.  A Multi-dimensional Approach to Disinformation, supra note 8, at 25 n.40. 
63. ISTE Standards for Students, INT’L SOC’Y FOR TECH. IN EDUC., https://www.iste.org/
standards/for-students  [https://perma.cc/E4MD-MC6L] ( last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
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Transparency compliments media literacy because knowledge of how and why 
content is posted is necessary for any digital media literacy efforts to be effective. 
To critically assess the information they are encountering, users will need to know 
its source and the motivation behind its dissemination. 
1. Bots 
Legislation aimed at requiring platforms to clearly label bots has the potential 
of reducing the effectiveness of disinformation. Bots, in the social media context, 
can be defined as automated online accounts that interact with users or other 
automated accounts.64 Bots have been used to “manufactur[e] consensus” by 
artificially increasing the visibility of content or users on social media platforms.65 
Such activity skews the popularity of ideas and gives them more credibility than they 
would otherwise get. A version of this phenomenon has been observed in the 
commercial context where armies of bots are often used to mislead consumers by 
participating in online reviews for products or businesses.66 
Bots have been an issue for years, but their recent popularity in political 
disinformation campaigns has resulted in an increased interest from lawmakers. The 
2016 U.S. presidential election has revealed the powerful influence that bots can 
have.67 One bot on Twitter reportedly generated 1200 posts during the final 
presidential debate.68 Such an outpour of content floods the conversation and 
makes it difficult for users to find quality content. This type of activity interferes 
with a person’s right to receive and impart information. 
Bot presence is likely to increase as the skill needed to create them has been 
made accessible to anyone with a preliminary understanding of programming 
code.69 But responses to the bot threat have to be carefully considered. Outright 
restrictions on bots would not only violate freedom of expression by restricting a 
person’s right to receive and impart information, but it would also prohibit “good” 
bots that can be used as fact checkers, to conduct research, or simply for 
entertainment. Proposals to ban “malicious” bots encounter the difficult issue of 
determining whether a bot is good or bad and determining who the appropriate 
entity to make that conclusion will be. Therefore, a more appropriate solution is to 
mark bots to allow the user to critically analyze the content they produce. 
 
64. See Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 990 (2019). 
65. Farhad Manjoo, How Twitter Is Being Gamed to Feed Misinformation, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/technology/how-twitter-is-being-gamed-to-feed-
misinformation.html [https://perma.cc/V4C3-MM5T] (quoting Samuel Woolley). 
66. Shareen  Pathak,  Amazon  Reviews  Have  a  Bot  Problem,  DIGIDAY  (Sept.  18,  2017), 
https://digiday.com/marketing/amazon-reviews-bot-problem/ [https://perma.cc/PZF6-UYUN]. 
67.  Douglas Guilbeault & Samuel Woolley, How Twitter Bots Are Shaping the Election, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11/election-bots 
/506072/ [https://perma.cc/3W99-CCJR]. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
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There are varying approaches to marking bots. One is for legislators to require 
the platforms to identify bots themselves and then give them some sort of 
distinguishing mark. This can be accomplished by requiring social media platforms 
to implement a program or algorithm to monitor bot-like behavior and then mark 
those accounts they catch. Another way to do so is to require the platforms to have 
their users register bot accounts or risk getting banned. This system would resemble 
Twitter’s verified accounts.70 Another, more aggressive, approach is to  
enact legislation that would require owners to have their bots disclose they are  
bots whenever they communicate with users. Some jurisdictions have  
already proposed or implemented versions of such legislation. For example, 
California recently passed a bill that subjects bot owners to liability.71 The relevant 
portion of the bill reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to use a bot to communicate or interact 
with another person in California online, with the intent to mislead the 
other person about its artificial identity for the purpose of knowingly 
deceiving the person about the content of the communication in order to 
incentivize a purchase or sale of goods or services in a commercial 
transaction or to influence a vote in an election. A person using a bot shall 
not be liable under this section if the person discloses that it is a bot.72 
The law went into effect on July 1, 2019.73 There may be some concern that 
this type of law is infringing on First Amendment rights by compelling speech.74 
However, it is worth noting that other laws require disclosure of certain content 
that is in the public interest, such as warning labels on bioengineered foods and 
labels for prescription drugs.75 
2. Location 
Many countries are concerned about disinformation emanating from foreign 
countries that aims to influence their citizens. Requiring platforms to determine or 
authenticate the geographical source of accounts or posts could potentially reduce 
the likelihood that a state’s domestic users would be influenced by disinformation 
by foreign entities. Such a strategy would address the concerns of foreign 
interference in elections that have arisen in recent years. 
Facebook is already experimenting with this idea after reports that Russian 
disinformation was spread during the 2016 U.S. presidential election by creating 
 
70. About Verified Accounts, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/
about-twitter-verified-accounts [https://perma.cc/VL9T-PA2H] ( last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
71. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17941 (West 2019). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. For an analysis of the legality of legislation to compel bot identity disclosures, see Lamo  
& Calo, supra note 64. 
75. 7 C.F.R. § 66.100 (2019) (disclosure requirement for bioengineered food); 21 C.F.R. § 290.5 
(2003) (warning label requirement for prescription drugs). 
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political pages impersonating American citizens.76 Facebook now requires pages of 
a “large US audience” to “secure their account with two-factor authentication and 
confirm their primary country location.”77 Facebook also displays the primary 
country location of the people who manage those pages.78 It plans to roll this system 
out to its other popular platform, Instagram, with a goal to “prevent organizations 
and individuals from creating accounts that mislead people about who they are or 
what they’re doing.”79 
Legislation that aims to require social media platforms to adopt similar 
methods would complement any efforts of increasing digital media literacy, but it 
also raises some concerns of its efficacy and risks of violating privacy rights. First, 
such a policy would be difficult to implement because users could circumvent it via 
virtual private networks and claim to be from whichever country they wish. Second, 
any efforts to go beyond self-reporting and IP address locations would have to be 
delicate so as not to intrude on privacy rights or place journalists or other vulnerable 
groups in danger from revealing their location. 
3. Advertisements 
Legislation could also require social media platforms to disclose the source of 
online political advertisements. Investigations after the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election revealed that foreign governments invested large amounts of money in 
Facebook advertising that reached over ten million people.80 In response, some 
platforms have already taken steps to make advertisements more transparent for 
their users.81 Transparency in this arena is critical because of the possibility of 
targeted political disinformation campaigns that may surge in the days before an 
election. In those situations, by the time false content is countered with the truth, 
the election may be over and important decisions would have already been made 
based on disinformation. 
Although the steps already taken by platforms are commendable, they are not 
uniform.82 Some platforms provide more information than others and offer 
differing levels of accessibility to the relevant content.83 Legislators may be 
 
76. New Authorization for Pages, FACEBOOK (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/
business/news/new-authorization-for-pages [https://perma.cc/DS96-ZT8Y]. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Mike Isaac & Scott Shane, Facebook’s Russia-Linked Ads Came in Many Disguises,  
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/technology/facebook-russia- 
ads-.html [https://perma.cc/VND7-EGVM]. 
81. See Political Content, TWITTER, https://ads.twitter.com/transparency [https://perma.cc/
U2WD-PB7H] ( last visited Jan. 3,  2020); Rob Leathern, Shining a Light on Ads With Political Content, 
FACEBOOK (May 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-political-content/ 
[https://perma.cc/2R9V-RLHW]. 
82. Compare the policies for political ads by Facebook and Twitter, found at Leathern, supra 
note 81, and Political Content, supra note 81. 
83.  Leathern, supra note 81, and Political Content, supra note 81. 
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interested in enacting legislation that will require disclosure in an accessible manner. 
California has recently passed a law that does just that.84 Set to take effect in 2020, 
the law requires platforms to include with each advertisement a disclosure of who 
paid for the advertisement and maintain records of advertisements disseminated on 
the platform.85 Such advertising is already regulated on the radio, television,  
and satellite.86 
On the other hand, legislation that aims to ban advertisement from foreign 
entities entirely may encounter First Amendment challenges in the United States 
and may violate international law’s requirement that the law be necessary and 
proportional.87 In the U.S. context, Professor Richard L. Hasen suggests that 
current case law would prevent outright bans on advertisements by foreign entities 
because current law only allows for the ban of foreign advertisement that supports 
a specific candidate, and not advertisements that are “issue advocacy.”88 
C. Platform Liability 
One of the most controversial legislative proposals is whether to make 
platforms liable for failing to remove disinformation. Germany has already enacted 
a law that strives to do just that.89 The “Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz law” imposes 
heavy fines (up to fifty million euros) on social media platforms with more than 
two million users for failing to remove “obviously illegal” posts.90 This law has been 
widely criticized for its threats to freedom of expression.91 The United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, expressed concerns with the law for its lack 
of judicial oversight and breadth that could prompt social media platforms to 
remove lawful content out of fear of being fined.92 In his Joint Declaration, he 
further stated: 
Intermediaries should never be liable for any third party content relating 
to those services unless they specifically intervene in that content or refuse 
to obey an order adopted in accordance with due process guarantees by an 
 
84. Assem. B. 2188, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB2188 [https://perma.cc/2JBX-52RG]. 
85. Id. 
86. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(b) (2014). 
87. See Ariel L. Bendor & Tal Sela, How Proportional Is Proportionality?, 13 INT’L  
J. CONST. L. 530, 530 (2015) (defining the international law proportionality requirement). 
88. Hasen, supra note 45, at 217; see 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
89. Germany Starts Enforcing Hate Speech Law, B.B.C. ( Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/
news/technology-42510868 [https://perma.cc/9D6G-Z3AR]. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Letter from David Kaye, U.N. Special Rapporteur, to Angela Merkel, Chancellor of 
Germany ( June 1, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-
DEU-1-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TNX-7KR8]. 
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independent, impartial, authoritative oversight body (such as a court) to 
remove it and they have the technical capacity to do that.93 
Notwithstanding the problematic legislation that has been enacted in 
Germany, it may be possible for legislation that holds social media platforms liable 
to conform with freedom of expression principles. For example, in the United 
States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has been an effective tool 
for victims of copyright infringement to get social media platforms to remove 
violative content.94 A similar framework can be constructed to remove content that 
is demonstrably illegal—in line with common law torts. Furthermore, as algorithms 
and perceptual hashing technology advance, content would be easier to remove, 
which reduces the burden on the social media platforms. U.S. Senator Mark  
R. Warner has proposed requiring platforms to do so in the United States.95 Senator 
Warner proposes to modify section 230 of the CDA to allow for holding social 
media platforms liable for failing to remove content after a victim has obtained a 
court order and noticed the platforms.96 Depending on how such a policy is 
implemented, it could satisfy freedom of expression requirements of due process 
and not overburden platforms. 
CONCLUSION 
Disinformation presents a danger to democracies and undermines people’s 
right to receive and impart information. At the same time, legislation that is not 
carefully crafted with freedom of expression rights in mind can also lead to 
concerning outcomes. Governments should refrain from enacting policies that 
place them or private actors in the position of determining what is true or false. 
That is partly due to the difficulty in determining what is objective truth.97 More 
importantly, however, it prevents bad actors from abusing such a system by 
restricting content that they find unfavorable. 
A more prudent approach for disinformation legislation on social media 
platforms is to enact policies that empower the users to make the truthful 
determination for themselves. This begins with an educated society that recognizes 
the risks of disinformation and is armed with the tools to spot it and come to their 
own conclusions. That is why digital media literacy should be at the forefront of 
disinformation legislation. 
Literacy would not be effective if social media platforms hide the information 
necessary to determine the veracity of the content their users come across. That is 
 
93. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression, supra note 58. 
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 101-122. (2012). 
95. SENATOR MARK R. WARNER, POTENTIAL POLICY PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION  
OF SOCIAL  MEDIA  AND  TECHNOLOGY  FIRMS  (2018),  https://graphics.axios.com/pdf/
PlatformPolicyPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2424-AGUA]. 
96. Id. 
97. Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 
673 (1986). 
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why legislation that aims to make social media platforms more transparent is 
essential. Transparency regarding who and what users are interacting with is critical 
for the users to make an informed decision based on the motives of the content 
creator. Therefore, legislation that requires the disclosures for bots, advertisements, 
and the source’s geographical location may reduce the effectiveness of 
disinformation campaigns. 
A more aggressive and potentially problematic approach is to make social 
media platforms liable for failing to remove false content. Concerns with this 
approach surround the platforms’ precautionary removal of otherwise legal content 
out of fear of being fined. It is also problematic in situations where the government 
or other actors are the decision makers in what gets to stay or get removed. 
Furthermore, approaches that do not incorporate due process mechanisms are not 
in line with freedom of expression principles. That is not to say that such an 
approach is not possible. As noted, in the United States, social media platforms have 
been required to remove certain content based on copyright claims. A similar 
framework can be implemented regarding false content as long as it conforms to 
freedom of expression principles. Such a policy would need due process through an 
impartial body, such as a court, and would need to avoid burdening social media 
platforms with removal. Suggested policies that would require a user to obtain a 
court order and notice the platform seem like plausible solutions to the issue when 
combined with technological advances in hashing technology that would make the 
removal of the content more efficient. 
 
